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PARTISANSHIP, POLITICS, AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE CURIOUS
CASE OF U.S. V. IKE BROWN
Donald Campbell'
ABSTRACT
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been described as the "crown jewel" of the
Civil Rights Movement. The success of the Act to remove official obstacles to
voting is undeniable, and the influx of African American voters into the political
system changed the nature of politics in the United States at all levels. The
political and cultural context has changed so greatly that in 2006, it was politi-
cally possible for the President Bush's Justice Department to bring the first claim
against an African American for violating the voting rights of white citizens.
This article seeks to explain how this suit was possible by the opening up of
"enforcement space" on the Justice Department's agenda. The article also warns
that African American politicians today should be concerned that traditional
methods of proving discriminatory intent under the Voting Rights Act could be
perversely harmful by allowing statements made during the civil rights era to be
used against them in a Voting Rights Act suit.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2005, an historic event occurred in Jackson, Missis-
sippi. On that day, the United States Justice Department filed a lawsuit
alleging violations of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. What made the action
extraordinary was that the suit marked the first charge by the federal
government against an African American for intimidation and discrimi-
nation against white voters. The suit was controversial and would have
been unheard of less than a decade before. The defendant in the suit was
Ike Brown - a political activist in a rural county in east Mississippi.2
The case assumed immediate partisan overtones. The Justice Depart-
ment argued that the suit was necessary. to ensure Americans of all races
the right to vote free from intimidation. Others disputed the govern-
ment's characterization. The president of the Mississippi Chapter of the
NAACP questioned the decision to proceed with the suit against Brown
when claims of voting discrimination by African American voters had not
been addressed by the Bush administration, and called the suit "highly
unusual and suspect."3 The case went to trial, lasted twelve days with 54
witnesses (41 government witnesses and 13 on behalf of the defendants).
The district court held that Brown had violated the Voting Rights Act and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.4
The Ike Brown case is important. It represents a potential new use for
the Voting Rights Act. How did it happen that this claim was politically
possible? What does it mean for the future of the Voting Rights Act? This
article addresses these two questions. The first question is answered by
considering the changing and more partisan political context coupled
with enforcement space that opened up after the original barriers to vot-
ing were eliminated by the Voting Rights Act. The answer to the second
question is less certain. It is not a stretch to say, however, that while the
case against Ike Brown was the first claim against an African American
under the Voting Rights Act, it will not be the last. This article should
serve as a warning to African American politicians and officeholders -
particularly in the South - of the potentially perverse interaction between
civil rights activism and the test to determine discriminatory intent under
the Voting Rights Act.
It is impossible to understand the Voting Right Act today, without
understanding the context in which it was enacted. Therefore, the article
first examines the passage of the 1965 Act (Part I). Part II then traces the
legislative history of voting rights legislation, culminating in passage of
2. The government named two other defendants in the suit - the Noxubee County
Democratic Executive Committee and the Noxubee County Election Commission.
All allegations presented by the government were against Ike Brown in his position
as chairman of the Noxubee County Election Commission. Therefore, references in
this article will be limited to the actions of Brown.
3. Jake Tapper & Avery Miller, Reverse Racism?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2005), http://
abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1449254 ("We've had several issues over the
years of what appeared to be racial discrimination against black voters and the Jus-
tice Department has yet to come in and do a thorough investigation . . . And for
them to take on this case is highly unusual and very suspect.").
4. United States v. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007), affd, 561 F.3d 420 (5th
Cir. 2009).
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the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Part III discusses how Southern politicians
responded to the Voting Rights Act by shifting tactics from an outright
denial of the right to vote to vote dilution. Part IV considers how the
political realities have changed since passage of the Act, and how the Act
operates in today's highly partisan environment. Part V examines the Jus-
tice Department's case against Ike Brown. Finally, Part VI argues that
African Americans - particularly in the South - should be concerned
about a shift to a partisan-based enforcement of the Voting Rights Act
because of the interaction between the activism in the civil rights move-
ment and the proof necessary to establish discriminatory intent under the
Voting Rights Act.
Perhaps it is appropriate that Mississippi is the site of this historic suit.
Mississippi was one of the first states to enact Jim Crow laws after recon-
struction, and the first state to engage in "massive resistance" after the
passage of the Voting Rights Act. It was also the site of some of the first
and most important litigation testing the contours of the Voting Rights
Act.5 With the case of United States v. Ike Brown, the state continues its
place in the evolution of voting rights law in the United States.
I. PUTTING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN CONTEXT
To understand the role the Voting Rights Act played in ensuring Afri-
can Americans access to the ballot, it is necessary to set out the methods
of disenfranchisement that existed before the Act's passage - methods
that were the impetus for the passage of this piece of legislation. South-
ern government officials devised creative methods to prevent African
Americans from voting. The four primary tools were the poll tax, literary
test, white primaries, and intimidation.6
The genesis of these tactics was the passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in 1870. The Amendment provided that citizens could not be de-
prived the right to vote based on "race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 7 Critically, the Amendment was a political compromise and
did not guarantee the right to vote - but merely prohibited governments
from denying the right to vote based on the listed categories.8 With pas-
sage of the Fifteenth Amendment, Southern governments intent on main-
5. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AF-
TER 1965 4 (1990) ("[Wlhat happened in Mississippi is particularly important be-
cause the first legal battles to overcome . . . new structural barriers were fought
there, and therefore the future prospects for elimination of those new barriers
throughout the South were critically dependent upon the results in the Mississippi
cases.").
6. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democ-
racy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 288 (2011) ("[Tlhe Democratic Party's complete
monopoly on the South [prior to 1965] was not the product of routine forces of
political competition .... Instead, that monopoly came about through a sequence
of purposeful actions taken at the end of Reconstruction, which included violence,
intimidation, informal manipulation, and fraud during elections.").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
8. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 3 (1976)
("While the final draft [of the Fifteenth Amendment] may have adhered to the ca-
nons of political realism, it proved inadequate as an instrument for protecting the
southern Negro. The Fifteenth Amendment did not confer the on anybody, but
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taining a segregated society designed new methods to restrict African
Americans from voting by adopting voting requirements that appeared
facially neutral.
While this section will focus on the four most prominent voting re-
strictions, they were not the only methods used to disenfranchise (prima-
rily African American) voters. For example, South Carolina passed a law
requiring voters to register between May and June of 1882 or risk forever
being banned from registering to vote.9 South Carolina also enacted a
law that required individuals to re-register to vote each time they moved
(a requirement that particularly affected African American migrant farm-
ers).10 More generally, the move from party ballots (which allowed voters
to identify candidates by party moniker) to secret ballots which removed
the party identifiers, also created difficulty for voters. Illiterate voters
found it difficult to select their preferred candidate from the listing of
candidates on the ballot. While this change impacted both blacks and
whites, it was a particular barrier for African Americans because of lack
of educational opportunities.11
A. White Primaries
There was perhaps no greater subterfuge in the area of voting rights
than the white primary. Primaries - preliminary voting held before the
general election to determine which candidates would compete in the
general election - arose out of a desire to ensure that white political can-
didates did not appeal to African American voters to get elected.12 The
goal was to keep disputes within the (white) party.13 In 1921, the United
States Supreme Court in Newberry v. United States held that primaries
were not part of the "election" of the candidate, but instead were
"merely methods by which party adherents agree upon candidates
whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by all qualified
electors."4 Under Newberry, the primary was a method for private indi-
viduals to organize and select candidates for the general election. Be-
cause the process was not administered by the state and there was no
state action, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibition on restricting the right
to vote did not apply.
merely stipulated that states could not invoke race as a ground for disfranchising
people otherwise eligible to vote.").
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 13 ("'Without the legal primary the fear was expressed by several that the
divisions among white men might result in bringing about a return to the
deplorable conditions when one faction of white men called upon Negroes to help
defeat another faction."') (quoting Josephus Daniels, editor of the Raleigh, North
Carolina News and Observer).
13. Morton Stavis, A Century of Struggle for Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: From the
Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 1965 - and Beyond, 57 Miss. L. J. 591, 603
(1987) ("Democrats were warned 'if whites split ... the Negroes would hold the
balance of power.' Ultimately, effective disfranchisement of blacks in order to pre-
vent coalitions with dissident Democrats became the device for suppressing not
only blacks but white dissidents as well.").
14. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).
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The distinction between primaries and general elections provided a
vehicle for the disenfranchisement of African American voters for those
seeking to maintain white supremacy in the South. States relied on the
categorization of primaries as private affairs to lawfully restrict participa-
tion in primaries to whites. In the one-party Democratic South, the pri-
mary election essentially decided the general election. Therefore, by
limiting African American access to the primaries, states were able to
deny them the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote.15
Over the years, the white primary went through a number of machi-
nations. As courts invalidated particular practices, new, more finely-
tuned discriminatory procedures would appear. The white Texas pri-
mary serves as an example of this evolved practice. In 1923 (two years
after Newberry), the Texas legislature enacted a statute which provided
that "in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic
party primary election in the State of Texas."16 The statute was chal-
lenged and Justice Holmes writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in
Nixon v. Herndon, noted "it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and
obvious infringement of the Fourteenth" Amendment.17 The presence of
legislation - clearly state action - and explicit reference to and distinction
based on race made this an easy case for the Court.18
Taking advantage of the limiting language of Nixon, the Texas legisla-
ture amended the statute to eliminate the facially discriminatory aspect of
the law, shifting eligibility decisions to the political parties: "[elvery polit-
ical party in this state through its state executive committee shall have the
power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its
own way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise partici-
pate in such political party . . ."19 Executive committees of the political
parties immediately passed rules that disqualified African Americans
from voting.20 Texas defended the new process, arguing that any discrim-
ination was the result of private (and not state) action - and therefore did
not implicate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.21 In response,
15. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 23-54. See also Civil Rights - Denial of Vote to Negroes in Pre-
Primary Election, 101 U.. PA. L. REv. 145 (1952).
16. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
17. Id. at 541.
18. Id. ("The statute of Texas... assumes to forbid negroes to take part in a primary
election the importance of which we have indicated, discriminating against them by
the distinction of color alone. States may do a good deal of classifying that it is
difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear for extended
argument that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting
the right set up in this case.").
19. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
20. Id. The Texas Democratic executive committee adopted the following resolution:
"[T]hat all white Democrats who are qualified and under the Constitution and laws
of Texas.... and none other, be allowed to participate in the primary elections .. "
21. Nixon v. Condon, 34 F.2d 464, 468 (W.D. Tex. 1929) (the Texas statute "provides no
action by a state, and directed no action be taken upon the part of any person or
individuals, that is prohibited by either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ments.... [The action by] defendants in denying and refusing to permit plaintiff to
vote at such Democratic primary election, is not shown to be the act of the state of
Texas, but to be that taken by private individuals .... ."), rev'd, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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the Texas State Democratic Party enacted a resolution barring African
Americans from membership in the Democratic Party. With the qualifica-
tion decision now made through the state party membership (and not at
the direction of state law), the question was whether this - now purely
private action - was constitutional.
In 1935, Justice Roberts writing for a unanimous Court in Grovey v.
Townsend, held that the decision by the state party did not constitute state
action and was therefore constitutional. While acknowledging statutes
that governed operation of Texas primary elections in great detail, the
Court held that such regulation did not make the decision of the political
party the equivalent of state action.22 To demonstrate the private nature
of the primaries, the Court noted that the party bore the primary ex-
penses, provided ballots, and counted the votes cast in the election.23 Fi-
nally, the Court noted that the state recognized the state convention of the
political parties for the purpose of determining the policies of the party.24
With this decision, the one-party South had an effective method of com-
pletely disenfranchising blacks from the political process.
The tide turned on white primaries in 1941. In United States v. Classic,
the Supreme Court held that primaries in Louisiana were "elections" in
the constitutional sense - and therefore were subject to constitutional lim-
itations.25 While distinguishing (and therefore not overruling) Grovey,26
Classic provided a list of factors to determine when an election would
violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Three years after Clas-
sic, in the case Smith v. Allright, the Court expressly overturned Grovey .27
Relying on Classic, the Court held,
It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a
primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination
by the State, like the right to vote in a general election is a right
secured by the Constitution. . . .By the terms of the Fifteenth
Amendment that right may not be abridged by any state on ac-
count of race. Under our Constitution the great privilege of the
ballot may not be denied a man by the State because of his color.28
The Court held that, because of the numerous regulations placed on
primary elections and the importance of those regulations in determining
the general election candidate, being a member of a political party be-
comes "the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nomi-
22. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1935). The Court provided a litany of stat-
utes that regulated primary elections. The regulations included, inter alia, the form
of the ballot, how the ballot was to be marked, the number of ballots to be provided
by the party for the election, the oath that primary election officials were required to
take, how ballot boxes were to be handled, and how election contests would
proceed.
23. Id. at 50.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
26. Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 61-63 (2001).
27. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
28. Id. at 661-62 (citation omitted).
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nees for a general election," and therefore "the state makes the action of
the party the action of the state."29 The Court further noted:
When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing offi-
cials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to deter-
mine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be
applied to the primary as applied to the general election. If the
state requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a general
election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits
the choice of the electorate in general elections for state offices,
practically speaking, to those whose names appear on such a bal-
lot, it endorses, adopts, and enforces the discrimination against
Negroes, practices by a party entrusted by Texas law with the de-
termination of the qualifications of participants in the primary.
This is state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment.30
In spite of the Court's ruling, Mississippi continued to hold white-only
primaries - alleging that the Allwright case did not apply to the state.31
However, African Americans in the state viewed the Allwright opinion as
the "second emancipation" and as an encouragement to seek the vote.32
The Allwright decision must be considered in its social context. It
came at a time when African American soldiers were returning from
World War II. The idea that the right to vote - the core of democracy -
should be denied from those who had fought on behalf of democracy,
made it difficult for elites in the South (Mississippi notwithstanding) to
justify continuing exclusion of African Americans through the white pri-
mary. Instead, Southern elites began to focus on other methods of exclu-
sion. These tactics included the poll tax, the literacy test, and the
intimidation.
B. Poll Tax, Literary Test, and Intimidation
The strategy of disenfranchising African American voters without ex-
plicit reference to race is what V.0. Key called the "Magnolia formula."33
This "formula" described methods set out in Mississippi's 1890 Constitu-
tion to restrict African Americans from voting.34 All southern states
amended their constitutions in a similar fashion, but Mississippi was the
first. Two provisions proved particularly effective. First was the inclu-
sion of what are referred to as "literacy and understanding tests."35
These provisions provided that, to qualify to vote, the applicant must "be
able to read any section of the constitution of this State" or, if illiterate,
29. Id. at 664-65 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 664.
31. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 101.
32. Id.
33. V.0. KEY JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE & NATION 538 (1949). It is also referred to
as the "Mississippi Plan." See Stavis, supra note 13, at 602.
34. The provisions had their desired effect. In Mississippi, after adoption of the 1890
constitution, only 6 percent of adult African Americans were registered to vote
(8,615 of 147,205 residents). See LAWSON, supra note 8, at 15.
35. Id. at 11.
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must be able to "understand the same when read to him, or give a rea-
sonable interpretation thereof."36 This gave great discretion to the white
registrars who made the determination of not only what section of the
constitution to read, but also whether the interpretation was "reasona-
ble."37 Louisiana, in its 1898 constitution, included what was known as a
"Grandfather Clause" - providing that males who were eligible to vote
on or before January 1, 1867, were exempt from the literacy requirement.38
Of course, because most African Americans were not eligible to vote
before that date, the exception applied almost exclusively to white
voters.39
After the Supreme Court invalidated the white-only primary in Allw-
right, southern states began to utilize the literacy test as a fall-back to pre-
vent otherwise qualified blacks from voting. Campaigning for the Senate
from Mississippi in 1946, Theodore Bilbo explicitly encouraged local reg-
istrars to utilize their discretion in administering the literacy test to ex-
clude African Americans from registering to vote, going so far as to say
that if "there is a single man or woman serving... who cannot think up
questions enough to disqualify undesirables then write Bilbo or any good
lawyer, and there are a hundred good questions which can be
furnished."40
The second preferred method to disenfranchise voters was the re-
quirement of a poll tax. The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 set the tax at
two-dollars. The tax operated to disenfranchise both poor whites as well
as blacks. The United States Supreme Court upheld Mississippi's poll tax
in Williams v. Mississippi.41 In that case, the Court held that the poll tax
requirement was not discriminatory on its face, and that there was no
evidence that it had been enforced in a discriminatory manner.42 Forty
years later in Breedlove v. Suttles, the Supreme Court again upheld the poll
tax (this time from Georgia) against claims that it violated equal protec-
tion (Fourteenth Amendment) and was an improper restriction on the
right to vote (Fifteenth Amendment).43
36. Miss. CONST. art. 12, § 244 (1890).
37. In Williams v. Mississippi, the literary test was challenged based on the fact that the
requirement was abused by the registrars administering the test - that the officer
would ask "all sorts of vain, impertinent questions." Williams v. Mississippi,170
U.S. 213, 221 (1898).
38. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 12-13.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 100.
41. Williams, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
42. Id. at 225 (1898) (holding that poll taxes and literary tests "do not on their face
discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual adminis-
tration was evil; only that evil was possible under them.").
43. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283(1937) ("To make payment of poll taxes a
prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States,
but is conferred by the state and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may condi-
tion suffrage as it deems appropriate."), overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Bd. Of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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There were a number of congressional attempts to restrict the use of
the poll tax, all of which were unsuccessful largely because opponents
feared that invalidating the poll tax would lead to calls for greater en-
franchisement of African American voters. For example William Colmer,
a member of the House of Representatives from Mississippi, argued,
"[T]he direct object of this movement [to invalidate the poll tax] is to
enfranchise the Negro in the South. If Congress can remove poll tax re-
quirements it can also remove educational requirements and registration
itself."44 Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo said bluntly: "If the poll tax
bill passes, the next step will be an effort to remove the registration quali-
fication, the education qualification of the negroes. If that is done we will
have no way of preventing negroes from voting."45
Southern Democrats and sympathetic Republicans in the Senate used
the filibuster to stop passage of legislation to limit use of the poll tax.46
Ultimately it took passage of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964 to
abolish it in federal elections.47
Intimidation of African Americans, while always present in the South,
gained importance as the inequities and discriminatory tactics of South-
ern whites were exposed nationally and as legal methods of suppressing
the vote came under greater judicial scrutiny. Intimidation could be
based on violence or fear. In 1946, Senator Theodore Bilbo, made it clear
that if all else failed, white Mississippians should resort to extra-legal
means to prevent African Americans from voting: "But you know and I
know what's the best way to keep the nigger from voting. You do it the
night before the election. I don't have to tell you any more than that.
Red-blooded men know what I mean."48 As an example of officially
sanctioned intimidation, in 1962 the Mississippi legislature enacted a law
requiring the names of all those taking the voter registration test to be
published in a newspaper. The purported reason was to give public no-
tice so that voter qualifications could be challenged, but in practice
"many black applicants found that after their name had been published
they were arrested on spurious charges; subjected to physical violence,
economic reprisals, or loss of employment; or found themselves unable to
get jobs."49 The law discouraged citizens from even attempting to register
to vote.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND ITS PREDECESSORS
The end of World War II along with the growing momentum of the
civil rights movement and the violent opposition to the movement made
44. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 67.
45. Id. at 70.
46. Id. at 55-85 (extensive discussion of the legislative attempts to abolish the poll tax).
47. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXTV § 1. The Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice
President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representa-
tive in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State
by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."
48. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 100.
49. PARKER, supra note 5, at 28.
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civil rights a political issue that could not be ignored. In response to these
pressures, Congress passed three Civil Rights bills, in 1957,50 1960,51 and
in 1964.52 For voting purposes, the culmination was passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.53
A. The 1957 Civil Rights Act
The Eisenhower Justice Department, prompted by the killings of
George Lee and Emmett Till in Mississippi, proposed what became
known as the 1957 Civil Rights Act.m4 The 1957 Act, while not the first
Civil Rights legislation put forward, was the first to overcome the filibus-
ter of southern senators and their allies. The Act, as originally proposed,
created a Civil Rights Commission (Part 1)55; provided an additional assis-
tant to the attorney general (Part 11)56; provided the attorney general the
authority to seek injunctions against civil rights violations (Part IV)57; and
provided specifically for enforcement of voting rights (Title V).58 The
most contested provision was in Title V - which gave authority to federal
judges to hold individuals in criminal contempt without a jury trial.59
Opposition to this provision came not only from southerners but also
from unions - who had seen this power used against labor activists. A
compromise on the provision was reached by making jury trials unavaila-
ble only where punishment would not be more than 45 days in jail and a
fine of not more than $300.60
The 1957 Act had three primary characteristics that carried forward in
future legislation. First, the Act provided the possibility of civil actions
rather than criminal prosecution of local officials.61 Second, the Act pro-
vided a means for the federal government - through the Civil Rights
Commission and the Justice Department - to gather information from
states and localities about voting practices in the South.62 This informa-
tion was necessary to prove violations of the Act. Finally, the Act pro-
vided that suit would be brought in federal court against election officials
50. Civil Rights Act of)1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634-38 (1957) (codified at 42 U.S. C.
§ 1971 (1957)).
51. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86-92 (1960) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1974 (1960)).
52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241-68 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1964)).
53. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
54. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 634; see LAWSON, supra note 8, at 141-64 (discuss-
ing the political considerations behind the civil rights positions of the Republican
and Democratic parties).
55. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 634.
56. Id. at 637.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 638.
60. Id. at 191-97.
61. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EN-
FRANCHISEMENT 187 (2004).
62. Id.
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- with federal courts having the power to ensure that the laws were
followed.63
B. The 1960 Civil Rights Act
After passage of the 1957 Act, civil rights activists and supporters ar-
gued the Act was insufficient. Because Congressional members from both
parties (with the exception of Southern members) did not want to risk
losing black voters, they attempted to draft legislation that would provide
further protection for voting rights, without ostracizing the majority of
white voters. 64 The result was the Civil Rights Act of 1960.
The 1960 Act, while a political compromise, did have some additional
provisions to protect the franchise. The Act (1) provided additional crimi-
nal penalties for violations of federal court orders;65 (2) required that
election officials maintain voting records for federal elections for twenty-
two months;66 (3) allowed the federal government to provide education
for the children of members of the armed forces when schools they at-
tended were closed to avoid integration;67 (4) provided the Attorney Gen-
eral the power to bring suit to establish that a particular area or
jurisdiction was engaged in a "pattern or practice" of depriving African
Americans of the right to vote;68 and finally (5) the Act allowed a federal
judge that found a pattern of discrimination to appoint a referee to review
applications of those rejected from registering to vote and report back to
the court.69 If the court then found that the application was wrongfully
rejected, the court had the power to add the individual to the voting
rolls.70
While the 1957 and 1960 Acts demonstrated a growing commitment to
civil rights, they were plagued with problems of delay and obstruction.71
The Acts utilized a time-consuming litigation-based approach and relied
on voluntary compliance by state and local officials.72 Voluntary compli-
ance and participation was not forthcoming. Local officials would with-
hold voter information. In Mississippi, state legislators changed
registration requirements to thwart federal enforcement attempts.73 The
changes "cleverly turned the pattern or practice requirement of the 1960
63. Id.
64. Id. at 164-67.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86-88 (1960) (codified at 42 U.S.
C. §1974 (1960)); Richard K. Caputo, Civil Rights Act of 1960, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA 207 (David Bradley & Shelley Fischer Fishkin eds.,
1998).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. at 88; Caputo, supra note 65.
67. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. at 89-90; Caputo, supra note 65.
68. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. at 90; Caputo, supra note 65.
69. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. at 90; Caputo, supra note 65
70. Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. at 90; Caputo, supra note 65
71. The judicial process, upon which all existing remedies depend, is institutionally in-
adequate to deal with practices so deeply rooted in the social and political struc-
ture." JAMES EASTLAND, VOTING RIGHTS LEGISTLATION, S.R. 162, at 10, 14 (1965)
(statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States). "Litigation on a
case-by-case basis simply cannot do the job." Id.
72. VALELLY, supra note 61, at 189.
73. Id.
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law against the federal govemment."74 In order to establish a pattern and
practice of discrimination the government needed data from a number of
elections. By changing the registration requirements before data could
accumulate, Mississippi made it difficult for federal officials to gather the
necessary data to assess compliance. "75 In addition to relying on state
and local election officials, the 1957 and 1960 Acts were premised on en-
forcement by federal judges in these areas.76 Federal judges were nomi-
nated at the recommendation of the Senator from the state and reflected
the values of their community. They often opposed expansion of civil
rights and the right to vote to African Americans.77 These judges would
either rule against the government or use their power to delay resolution
of claims.78
C. The 1964 Civil Rights Act
The 1964 Civil Rights Act passed after the assassination of President
John Kennedy.y9 President Johnson pushed the issue of civil rights further
than any prior administration. The 1964 Act's primary focus was on end-
ing discrimination in places of public accommodation - the voting rights
provisions were the least controversial aspects of the bill.80 However, the
Act did contain certain provisions relating to voting rights. The Act's pro-
visions required that all voting procedures be administered in a consis-
tent manner and prohibited the denial of the right to vote based on non-
material errors on registration documents.1 The Act also required that all
literacy tests be in writing and that a sixth-grade education created the
presumption of literacy.82 Additionally the legislation empowered the
Attorney General to bring suit before a three judge panel when there was
an allegation of pattern or practice of voting discrimination.83 Finally, the
Civil Rights Commission was given the authority to investigate voter
fraud as well as denial of the right to vote.84
D. The 1965 Voting Rights Act
Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964,
the goal of achieving wide-spread voter registration and participation of
African Americans - particularly in the deep south - proved elusive. To
demonstrate this, consider this fact noted by Professor Neil McMillen:
"Mississippi... permitted fewer blacks to vote for Lyndon Baines John-
son in 1964 than had been eligible to vote for William McKinley in
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 188.
77. Id. at 189.
78. Id.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 268 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1964)).
80. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 299.
81. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 101(2)(B), 78 Stat. at 241, LAWSON, supra note 8, at 299.
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 101(2)(C), (3)(b), 78 Stat. 241-42.
83. Id. at § 101(3)(h), 78 Stat. at 242.
84. Id. at § 104(a)(1), 78 Stat. at 251
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1896."85 In 1966, the Supreme Court summarized the problems faced
under prior legislation:
Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requir-
ing as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing through the regis-
tration records in preparation for trial. Litigation has been
exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for
delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the proceed-
ings. Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained,
some of the States affected have merely switched to discrimina-
tory devices not covered by the federal decrees or enacted difficult
new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between
white and Negro registration. Alternatively, certain local officials
have defied and evaded court orders or have simply closed their
registration offices to freeze the voting rolls. The provision of the
1960 law authorizing registration by federal officers has had little
impact on local maladministration because of its procedural
complexities.86
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 moved from a case-by-case analysis to a
uniform system of regulation that went into effect without the necessity
of individual lawsuits.87 For example, Section 4 of the Act outlawed liter-
acy tests for five years in certain states.88 Section 5 of the Act provided
that if a jurisdiction met the criteria of Section 4, (commonly referred to as
"covered" jurisdictions) all voting regulations were frozen, and any
changes had to be submitted to either the Attorney General of the United
States or the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia for approval -
a process known as preclearance.89 Jurisdictions that were covered under
this formula at the time the Act was passed included the states of Ala-
bama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, 26
counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona.90
The Act also gave the Attorney General the authority to appoint fed-
eral officers ("registrars") to monitor registration of voters in the jurisdic-
tions covered under Section 4 to ensure that all those legally entitled to
85. Neil R. McMillen, Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: Federal Enforcement and Black
Protest in the 1960s, 43 J. OF S. HIST. 351, 351-52 (1977).
86. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966).
87. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-46 (1965) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1965)); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328 ("Congress had found that case-by-
case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination
in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to over-
come the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After en-
during nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the per-
petrators of the evil to its victims."); see also Stavis, supra note 13, at 661.
88. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438. Covered states were those using
literacy tests on November 1, 1964. Id. at § 4(b)(1). It also covered states where voter
registration on November 1, 1964 or voter turnout in 1964 presidential election was
less than 50 percent of the voting age residents. Id. at § 4(b)(2).
89. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439.
90. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
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vote were registered.91 The Attorney General was also given the power to
appoint poll-watchers to observe the voting process in covered
jurisdictions.92
Other provisions authorized the Attorney General to challenge the
constitutionality of the poll tax in jurisdictions that retained it for state
elections (the poll tax was abolished in federal elections by the Twenty-
fourth Amendment93). The Act also provided penalties for those interfer-
ing with the right to vote or engaging in voter fraud.94 The most signifi-
cant and controversial provisions of the Act were upheld as a valid
exercise of Congress's power under the Fifteenth Amendment in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.95
III. MOVING FROM VOTE DENIAL TO VOTE DILUTION
The Voting Rights Act was successful in its primary goal of removing
officially sanctioned barriers to voting or registering to vote. However,
after the Act passed, African Americans faced challenges equal to any
official barrier. Though the Voting Rights Act guaranteed the franchise,
but if African Americans were unable to or failed to utilize the right to
vote, then it was a hollow victory. In the elections following the 1965
Act's passage, it was discovered that while black voter registration greatly
increased, black participation did not - African American candidates did
not win elections even in the counties where African Americans repre-
sented a majority of the population.96 This result has been termed the
"realization gap" - the fact that although African Americans could now
register to vote they could not realize the benefits of that right.97
Two primary reasons have been cited for the existence of this gap.
First, because of the stringent caste system that placed education - both as
a matter of literacy and civics - off-limits to African Americans, there was
limited cultural awareness of the franchise. As Fannie Lou Hamer state-
ment: "I had never heard until 1962 that black people could register to
vote .... I didn't know we had the right," served as a disheartening
example of the dearth of knowledge about African American's right to
vote98 The second barrier was fear of economic reprisal and suppres-
sion.99 Ownership and control in the business and finance world, gave
91. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 6-8, 79 Stat. at 440.
92. Id. at § 8, 79 Stat. at 441.
93. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; Voting Rights Act of 1965 §10, 79 Stat. at 442.
94. Id. at § 11(c), 79 Stat. at 442.
95. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 318.
96. Lester M. Salamon & Stephen Van Evera, Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of
Three Explanations of Political Participation, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1288, 1290 (Dec.
1973).For example, in the 1971 Mississippi elections, "309 blacks ran for public office
at either the state or county level. Of these, 259 lost, including 28 out of 29 candi-
dates for state legislature, 10 out of 10 candidates for Chancery Clerk (county execu-
tive), 14 out of 14 candidates for Sheriff, 10 out of 10 candidates for county School
Superintendent, and 67 out of 74 candidates for county Board of Supervisors, even
though virtually all of candidates were running in districts with black majorities."
97. PARKER, supra note 5, at 30-31.
98. McMUllen, supra note 85, at 352.
99. Salamon & Van Evera, supra note 96, at 1300. "The evidence suggests quite
powerfully that the heritage of exploitation and repression, sustained by persistent
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the white political and business elite a particularly powerful weapon to
discourage African Americans from asserting civil or political rights. As
one scholar noted: "If a black became 'uppity' and began demanding his
'rights,' it was easy to organize a comprehensive program of coercion: to
have him fired, deprived of a loan at the bank or store, barred from re-
ceiving welfare, and harassed by the authorities."100 One banker is
quoted as telling a black customer seeking a loan: "If you can afford to
vote, you don't need a loan."o1 Black Mississippi teachers commonly
cited fear of losing their job as the reason they chose not to vote.102 These
express or implied threats of economic retaliation - with the commiserate
harm not only to the potential voter but also to their family - created
strong disincentives for some African Americans to go to the polls. Add
to this the reality that technology and automation were changing the na-
ture of the farming industry - where many African Americans in the
south worked - making their economic position even more vulnerable to
economic coercion. 03 Thus, for individuals in the rural south, even while
living in a democratic society, their individual situation was more akin to
what James Prothro described as a "totalitarian local system" because of
the fear of economic reprisal by the white economic and political elite for
asserting the right to vote.1 04 These cultural and social barriers to partici-
pation could not be remedied merely by passage of a statute. Instead,
what was needed was a concerted effort to educate and mobilize the Afri-
can American community. Only through organization and collective ac-
tion could an individual, who separately might be hesitant to participate
due to fear of reprisal, be willing to become an active participant in the
electoral process. However, collective action organized by non-local indi-
viduals provided further ammunition for local families as local white
community members were inclined to blame "outsiders" for mobiliza-
tion efforts instead of local citizens.105
There are a number of scholars who debate the reasons that motivated
individuals come together to assert their collective rights.06 In the con-
economic dependence and coercion, may be doing to the Voting Rights Act of 1965
what it did to the Emancipation Proclamation a century before: transforming it into
a legal form lacking social content." Id.
100. Id. at 1294.
101. PAT WATrERS & REESE CLEGHORN, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: THE ARRIVAL OF NE-
GROES IN SOUTHERN POLITICS 129 (1967).
102. Voting Rights: Hearing on H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals to Enforce the 5th Amendment
of the Constitution Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 301 (1965) (Exhibit
No.56 - Voting Rights of Negro Teachers in Four Mississippi Counties by James W.
Prothro & Lewis Lipstats).
103. McMillen, supra note 85, at 361 ("Always dependent on the beneficence of white
landowners, these Delta Negroes were made doubly vulnerable by the encroach-
ments of such labor-displacing developments as chemical herbicides and mechani-
cal harvesters .... ).
104. McMillen, supra note 85, at 354 ("A dependent people in a land of unremitting
white supremacy, blacks in some quarters of Mississippi lived under what James W.
Prothro chose to call 'a totalitarian local system."').
105. Salamon & Van Evera, supra note 96, at 1299.
106. See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS (1965); Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Mark S.
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text of civil rights it has been theorized that organization for collective
action may be stimulated by past harms that were inflicted on those in-
volved in the movement. The memories of these events - e.g. the Emmett
Till lynching in 1955107 or the images of the Selma to Montgomery
marches in 1965 - created a collective consciousness that political entre-
preneurs utilized to encourage collective action. In other words, "a
group's shared sense of the past could contribute to collective action by
strengthening the bonds of group identity, providing a frame to articulate
grievances, or by reducing material incentives for group members to en-
gage in cooperative action."108 Black consciousness could also be
achieved through education of the nature and basis of their status. In-
stead of assuming, as the white political elite would stress, that the poor
and disenfranchised African Americans were in that position because of
inherent characteristics or the lack of a work ethic, African Americans
began to recognize that the cause of their plight was not their own short-
comings - but instead a social construction by the ruling elite.109 As this
realization grew, the sense of collective political empowerment also grew:
"The result [was] a mentally healthier and politically more active black
citizenry. The strong sense of self-confidence and a deep suspicion re-
garding the willingness and ability of government to respond to their
needs.. .proved to be an important catalyst, mobilizing blacks to seek to
influence the policy process."0
An activated group consciousness could be utilized as an effective
weapon against the closed system of the 1960s South. Events such as the
mock elections in which large numbers of African Americans partici-
pated, the Freedom Summer, and (in Mississippi) the formation of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party "heralded the birth in Mississippi
of a proud new black psyche, a new sense of militancy and racial solidar-
ity."' The rise of slogans such as "black power" gained particular sali-
ence in Mississippi - where it was believed that the only way of
overcoming the obstruction of the ruling elite was to gain power through
Bonchek, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 221-243
(1997).
107. Stories: The Long Arm of the Law - Reopened Investigation into the 1955 Kidna pping and
Murder of Emmett Till, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 1, 2004), http://
www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2004/june
108. Frederick C. Harris, It Takes a Tragedy to Arouse Them: Collective Memory and Collective
Action During the Civil Rights Movement, 5 Soc. MOVEMENT STUD. 19, 20 (May 2006).
See Charles Payne, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION
AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 201-202 (1995) ("[I]n the spring of 1963,
those whites desperately opposed to the [civil rights] movement were slow to un-
derstand that the calculus of repression had changed. They had now entered a situ-
ation in which a significant number of Greenwood [Mississippi] Blacks, no longer
feeling so alone and in some cases no longer fearing that there was much that could
be done to them anyway, reacted to each additional act of intimidation by becoming
more aggressive themselves.").
109. See Richard D. Shingles, Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing
Link, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 76 (1981).
110. Id. at 89.
111. McMillen, supra note 85, at 369.
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solidarity.112 In fact, the right to register and vote became synonymous
with the goals of solidarity and collective action. "Voter registration [is a
source of] black power. Power is invested in the ballot and that's why the
white man worked like hell to keep you away from it.... We were even
taught that it was not right to register [to vote]."113
The creation of a race-based collective consciousness, while controver-
sial in the civil rights community, was critical to ensure the mobilization
necessary to press for change. It helped to encourage and develop black
leaders, to prompt the participation of individuals who might otherwise
stay on the sidelines, which in turn provided the nation a glimpse of the
trials of southern blacks in seeking to vote. In short, black consciousness
created an effective counter to the obstructions of the white power elite.
Black consciousness had a concrete goal - black political power - demon-
strated through voting and winning elections.114
For activists, solidarity was a means to an end. The end was political
power. Activists believed that, through the vote, African Americans
would be able to have a voice in the political institutions from which they
had been excluded.115 A presumption underlying the push for the vote
for African Americans was that once an African American preferred can-
didate was elected, then they would work to enact legislation that bene-
fited the African American community.
As the African American community came together to assert their col-
lective rights, those opposed to the rise in black political power and the
commensurate loss of power for themselves, started to look for methods
that would dilute the African American vote. A primary method was to
adjust voting laws - known as "massive resistance statutes."116 Prior to
1966 Mississippi law required all counties in the state to be divided into
five districts with a representative from each district sitting on a board of
supervisors. In 1966 - in direct response to the Voting Rights Act - the
Mississippi legislature allowed counties to abolish the districts and elect
members of the board of supervisors based on the vote of the entire
112. Joyce Ladner, What 'Black Power' Means to Negroes in Mississippi, 5 SOCIETY 7, 8
(1967). "Since many of the efforts Mississippi Negros made to change the social
structure - through integration - were futile, they began to reconceptualize their
fight for equality from a different perspective, one designed to acquire long-sought
goals through building bases of power." Id.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. "Black power is political power held by Negroes. It means political control in
places where they comprise a majority ... Black power is legitimate because any
time people are in a majority, they should be able to decide what will and will not
happen to them."
115. Id. ("Black power means controlling the Negro community. It means that if the
Negro community does not want white cops coming in, they can't come in. It
means political, economic, and social control."). Activists also discussed collective
power African Americans could acquire if they started putting "money together to
organize cooperatives, and other kinds of businesses." Id. "We can get political
power by putting Negroes into public offices .... We will have to tell them to vote
only for Negro candidates." Joyce Ladner, What 'Black Power' Means to Negroes in
Mississippi, 5 SOCIETY 7, 8 (1967). See also PARKER, supra note 5, at 30.
116. PARKER, supra note 5, at 7, 35. Many of these changes were enacted during the 1966
Mississippi legislative session (the "massive resistance session.").
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county (an at large election) but required that each supervisor actually
reside in the district she was to represent. 117 Additional tools utilized to
neutralize the impact of the Voting Rights Act included: "racial gerry-
mandering of district lines, abolishing elective offices and making them
appointive, and increasing the qualifying requirements for candidates
running for elective office."118 While legislators certainly knew that these
procedures would be challenged, they could take comfort in the fact that
the legal challenges would take years to resolve (a lesson learned in the
school desegregation cases) and that they had a greater chance of having
their actions upheld by avoiding explicit references to race in debating
the changes.119
The question was whether these type of structural changes to the vot-
ing process implicated the Voting Rights Act. If they were changes to the
"procedure with respect to voting" then these changes required
preclearance from the Justice Department before going into effect. Inevi-
tably, southern states implemented these procedures without approval.
In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court faced the ques-
tion of whether the Mississippi change from district to at-large voting im-
plicated the Voting Rights Act and thus were subject to preclearance
review. Though the change did not restrict anyone from voting. It was
not a procedure, such as the poll tax or literary test, that placed actual
barriers. The court had to determine if this type of change - which had
the effect of denying African Americans representation but not the
franchise - should fall under the preclearance provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the court, determined that
Section 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] "was aimed at the subtle, as well as
the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens
their right to vote because of race." 20 He went on to note that,
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as
well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot .... Voters
who are members of a racial minority might well be in the major-
ity in one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a
whole. This type of change could therefore nullify their ability to
elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some
of them from voting.121
The Allen decision not only expanded the types of voting changes that
were subject to Justice Department preclearance review, it also provided
an expanded concept of vote dilution. The Court had previously recog-
117. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550 (1969). In addition to the change
from district to at large elections of members of the board of supervisors, the Allen
case dealt with a number of other similar changes - e.g. an amendment that
changed the county superintendents of education position from an elected position
to an appointed position. This amendment also placed restrictions on the ability of
independent candidates to run in general elections. Id.
118. PARKER, supra note 5, at 1.
119. See PARKER, supra note 5, at 7, 39.
120. Allen, 393 U.S. at 565. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-
46 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965)).
121. Id. at 569.
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nized vote dilution claims with regard to the individual vote in reappor-
tionment cases, but Allen broadened the concept to include dilution of a
group of voters.122
Since changes to laws that resulted in the dilution of the vote had been
deemed as the effective denial of the right, it stood to reason that such
dilution would "deny or abridge" voting rights, which was prohibited
under Section 2 of the Act.123 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
the 1979 case Mobile v. Bolden.124
In Bolden, African American citizens of Mobile challenged the at-large
system of electing City Commissioners - arguing that the system diluted
African American voting strength and therefore, under Allen effectively
denied them the right to vote under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.125
The challenged procedure had been in effect in Mobile since 1911.126 The
Court ruled that Section 2's prohibition was identical to the prohibitions
of the Fifteenth Amendment.127 Turning to prior decisions interpreting
the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court held that, to demonstrate a denial or
abridgement of the right to vote when the challenged action was neutral
on its face, the challenger must prove that the action was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.28 Absent proof of a "racially discriminatory mo-
tivation" in enacting the challenged voting procedure, there was no Sec-
tion 2 violation.129 This was an explicit rejection of the argument that any
dilution of African American votes was actionable. As the Court suc-
cinctly put it:
The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro
candidates elected . . . . That Amendment prohibits only pur-
poseful discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of
the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude." Having found that Negroes in Mobile "register
and vote without hindrance," the District Court and Court of Ap-
122. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990
32-33 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds., 1994).
123. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980), superseded by statute, The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965), as recognized in Thorton v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986). "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by an State or political subdivision to deny
or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color." Id.
124. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 55.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id. at 59.
127. Id. at 61 ("The view that [Section 2] simply restated the prohibitions already con-
tained in the Fifteenth Amendment was expressed without contradiction during the
Senate hearings.").
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id. On remand, the challengers were faced with discovering evidence that the deci-
sion to adopt an at large system in the early twentieth century was motivated by
racial discrimination. After hiring three historians who spent numerous hours re-
searching the issue, the court found sufficient evidence that adoption of the at large
system was in fact racially motivated. DAVIDSON & GROFMAN, supra note 122, at 33-
34.
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peals were in error in believing that the [City of Mobile] invaded
the protection of that Amendment in the present case.130
Bolden triggered Congressional response. Debate centered on whether
the test for discrimination under Section 2 should be based on the results
of elections (results test) or should instead focus on the intent of the state
actors to determine whether discrimination occurred (the Bolden intent
test).131
Proponents of the results test argued that courts, in identifying dis-
crimination, should look to the totality of the circumstances, instead of
focusing solely on the intent of the state actors who adopted the system. 32
Those opposed to the results test argued that it would, in effect, create a
proportionality standard, where voting practices are considered discrimi-
natory if minority officials are elected at a lower rate than the makeup of
the community - regardless of the presence of discriminatory intent.133
Language was included in the bill that proportionality would not be a
basis for violation - but opponents were skeptical that the language
would be sufficient to satisfy their concerns. 34
Intent test supporters contended that Bolden merely restated prior law
and no amendment to the Voting Rights Act was necessary. 35 Under
Bolden, they argued, a claimant could establish a violation through more
than direct evidence of discriminatory motive. A violation could also be
established through indirect evidence of improper motive.136 Questions
arose as to whether evidence of discriminatory intent (direct or indirect)
could be established in most cases because some of the challenged voting
systems were decades old - and evidence of the intent at the time the
challenged process was enacted would be difficult if not impossible to
obtain37 Opponents also argued that the Voting Rights Act should focus
on more than merely the intent of the original actors - its purpose should
be to prohibit discrimination regardless of whether the intent of establish-
ing the system was discriminatory.138
Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) provided a compromise. He suggested
amending the language to provide that the test for discrimination should
be whether the implementation of the voting system was discriminatory -
not the ultimate outcome of elections. Under this approach, the question
became not who minorities voted for, but whether they had "access and
130. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65.
131. See generally Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1397-98 (1983)
(detailing the principle elements of the controversy regarding in Section 2).
132. Voting Rights Act, Vol. 1, Hearing on S.53, S.176, S.1975, S.1992, & H.R. 3112 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd 199
(1982) (statement of Orrin Hatch, Sen.).
133. Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1397-98 (1983)
134. Id. at 1400-01.
135. Id. at 1397.
136. Id. at 1404.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1405.
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whether or not the system is open."139 Senator Dole's amendment allevi-
ated the proportionality concern of enough Senators to lead to the amend-
ment's passage.140
As amended Section 2 prohibits conduct that "results in a denial or
abridgement of" voting rights."14, A new subsection was also added, to
reflect Senator Dole's proposal.142 Thus, the amendment created a Section
2 violation when there was either direct evidence that a system was
adopted because of discrimination or "that the challenged system or
practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in ques-
tion, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political pro-
cess."143 The concern that this test would become essentially a quota
system for particular groups - i.e. blacks or Hispanics -prompted two
actions. First, the Dole Amendment provided that Section 2 did not cre-
ate "a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population."144 Second the Senate Judici-
ary Committee Report set out "typical factors" that might be considered
when analyzing a claim under the "totality of the circumstances" test.
These factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in
the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used un-
usually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the mi-
nority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process; F
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such ar-
eas as education, employment and health, which hinder their abil-
ity to participate effectively in the political process;
139. Voting Rights Act, Vol. 2 Appendix, Hearing on S.53, S.176, S.1975, S.1992, & H.R. 3112
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2nd 80 (1982) (statement of Robert Dole, Sen.).
140. Boyd & Markman, supra note 105, at 1420-21.
141. Voting Rights Act of 1965 §2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1982) ("A violation.., is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is show that the political process... are not equally open to partic-
ipation by members of a class of citizens protected.., in that its members have less
opportunity than other[s] ... to participate in the political process .. the extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office ... is one circum-
stance which may be considered: Provide That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population.").
143. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 205 (1982).
144. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973(b)(1982).
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6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.145
Additional factors include "whether there is a significant lack of re-
sponsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority group" and "whether the policy underlying
the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prereq-
uisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous."146
A. Establishing a Violation of Section 2 After the 1982 Amendments
The Supreme Court first considered the totality of the circumstances
test proposed in Section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles.47 The case involved
challenges to North Carolina's redistricting plan for its state legislative
bodies after the 1980 census. The challengers claimed that the redistrict-
ing scheme violated Section 2 by diluting African American citizens'
"ability to elect representatives of their choice."4 8 As Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, noted, "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."149 Thus, for ex-
ample, if multimember districts operate to cancel out the voting strength
of a racial group within the district it would result in a violation of the
Act.50 However, as the Court notes, the fact that a racial group loses an
election does not automatically create a violation of Section 2. The chal-
lengers have the burden of demonstrating that the challenged procedure
"operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred
candidates."151 A violation is found when the impact not only to deprives
a racial group of the ability to elect their preferred candidate, but also
"allows those elected to ignore [minority] interests without fear of politi-
cal consequences, leaving the minority effectively unrepresented."152
The Thornburg Court adopted the factors from the Senate report. 153 The
Court, citing the factors held that the North Carolina redistricting plan
violated Section 2.154 First, they found that North Carolina had "officially
discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the
voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970" through various pro-
cedural mechanisms (such as the poll tax and literacy test).55 Second,
"historic discrimination in education, housing, employment, and health
145. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 206-07 (1982) (quoted with approval in Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986)).
146. Id. at 207.
147. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
148. Id. at 46..
149. Id. at 47.
150. Id. at 46-51.
151. Id. at 48.
152. Id. at 48 n.14 (1986) (citation omitted).
153. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 206-07 (1982)
154. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986)
155. Id. at 38.
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services had resulted in a lower socioeconomic status for North Carolina
blacks as a group than for whites."156 This lower status "both gives rise
to special group interests and hinders blacks' ability to participate effec-
tively in the political process and to elect representatives of their own
choice."157 Third, the voting procedures were found to "operate to lessen
the opportunity of black voters to elect candidates of their choice."158
Here, the court noted that North Carolina had a majority vote require-
ment for primary elections - which "present[ed] a continuing practical
impediment to the opportunity of black voting minorities to elect candi-
dates of their choice."159 Fourth, white candidates encouraged voters to
choose candidates based on race by appealing to racial prejudice. The im-
pact "lessen[ed] to some degree the opportunity of black citizens to par-
ticipate effectively in the political processes and to elect candidates of
their choice."160 Fifth, the court considered how successful African Amer-
icans had been in winning elections for office.161 The Court noted that,
while it had become possible for African Americans to be elected to pub-
lic office in North Carolina, "in comparison to white candidates running
for the same office, black candidates [are] at a disadvantage in terms of
relative probability of success"162 and that "the overall rate of black elec-
toral success has been minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in
the total state population."163 Finally, the Court noted that voting in the
challenged area was racially polarized.164
In addition to delineating the necessary elements to evaluate in a Sec-
tion 2 claim, the Court faced the question of determining how challenges
should demonstrate racial polarization. The district court looked for a
correlation between race and voting - simply identifying whether race
correlated with vote. 165 North Carolina argued that the test should con-
sider more than correlation - that the Court should consider factors other
than race to ensure that race was the true motivating factor for polariza-
tion.166 The state proposed a test in which the court took into account
factors such as "party affiliation, age, religion, income, incumbency, edu-
cation, campaign expenditures. "167 The goal, according to the State, was
to utilize statistical analysis to separate out these different motivations
and calculate the likely impact of race versus party affiliation versus age,
etc. 168 The goal would be to determine whether or not race was the "pri-
mary determinant of voter behavior."69 In other words, if statistical anal-








164. Id. at 41.
165. Id. at 61.
166. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61 (1986).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 62.
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ysis demonstrated that voting patterns are correlated more with
socioeconomic level than race - then the voting, while perhaps polarized,
could not be considered racially polarized.170
The Court rejected this approach - holding that voter polarization
"means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a
certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where
different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different
candidates."171 The problem with the North Carolina approach, accord-
ing to the Court, was that race and socioeconomic status were highly cor-
related and indicative of past discrimination.172 For example, an African
American voter who worked menial jobs (low socioeconomic position)
because of discrimination could appear to be motivated by socioeconomic
status when that characteristic exists because of underlying problems of
racism and discrimination.173 The Court also noted that a more stringent
test would always provide proof that vote was based on something other
than race - e.g. African Americans would appear to vote as a "bloc"
based not on race but on the policy positions of the candidate who sup-
ported positions consistent with socioeconomic status (with the same be-
ing true for white voters).174 The Court held that this analysis would
allow discriminatory actions to hide behind these justifications deny "the
fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely corre-
lated" and would "neither a practical evaluation of reality nor a func-
tional analysis of vote dilution."175
IV. CONSIDERING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN CONTEXT
With the history and context of the Voting Rights Act in mind, this
Part discusses the role of the Act today. The Act is structured to operate
as a "command and control" method of regulating voting requirements
and prohibiting voting restrictions. The Act imposes rigid standards, and
does "not allow regulated actors latitude to make decisions about how
most effectively, in their own diverse contexts, to realize the aims of the
Act; those actors were the object of the act's mistrust."176 This "command
170. Id. at 64 ("Appellants and the United States contend that the legal concept of 'ra-
cially polarized voting' refers not to voting patterns that merely correlated with the
voter's race, but to voting patterns that are determined primarily by the voter's race,
rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic characteristics.") (emphasis original).
171. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62 (1986).
172. Id. at 64.
173. Id. at 64-65.
174. Id. at 66.
175. Id. at 66 ("We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the
anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leads - that Congress intended,
on the one hand, that proof that a minority group is predominantly poor, unedu-
cated, and unhealthy should be considered a factor tending to prove a § 2 violation;
but that Congress intended, on the other hand, that proof that the same socioeco-
nomic characteristics greatly influence black voters' choice of candidates should de-
stroy these voters' ability to establish one of the most important elements of a vote
dilution claim.").
176. Richard H. Pildes, Political Competition and the Modern VRA, in THE FuruRE OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 7-8 (David L. Epstein, Richard H. Pildes, Roldolfo 0. de la
Garza, & Sharyn O'Halloran eds., 2006).
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and control" approach was necessary when African Americans were re-
stricted from full participation in the democratic process. Local officials
could not be trusted to have discretion in the area of voting rights because
they would utilize any available avenue to deny the vote to African
Americans.177 However, the context - both political and cultural - has
changed in the forty-plus years since the passage of the Act.
At the time of the Voting Rights Act's passage, African Americans
made up a majority of the population in many jurisdictions in the South.
The lack of participation and representation was not based on too few
votes, but on obstacles to voting - the poll tax, literary test, etc. The Vot-
ing Rights Act was enacted to remove these obstacles, and it succeeded.
Today, in many jurisdictions where there is an African American major-
ity, African Americans have assumed political power. The change is tell-
ing. In 2006, black voter registration in Mississippi exceeded white
registration by 1.5%.178 In addition, the number of African American of-
fice holders at every level has increased dramatically since 1970.179
Even more impressive is the number of African American elected offi-
cials in the states with the largest percentages of black residents as of the
2010 census. These six states alone - which includes only one state in the
top ten in top ten in total population - account for over 43% of the total
number of black elected officials. To demonstrate the tremendous
amount of success, consider that in 2000, Mississippi and Alabama had
more elected African American officials than the entire country in 1970.180
TABLE 1181
State African American Number of local offices
(total population rank) percentage of population held in 2000182
Mississippi (31) 38 604
Louisiana (25) 33 383
Georgia (9) 32 387
Maryland (19) 31 92
South Carolina (24) 29 330
Alabama (23) 27 545
177. Id.
178. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 227 (2009) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) ("The current statistical evidence confirms that the emergency that
prompted the enactment of § 5 has long since passed. By 2006, the voter registra-
tion rates for blacks in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi had jumped to 71.8%,
66.9%, and 72.2%, respectively... In 2006, the disparity [between white and black
voter registration] was only 3 percentage points in Alabama, 8 percentage points in
Louisiana, and in Mississippi, black voter registration actually exceeded white voter
registration by 1.5 percentage points.").
179. DAVID A. BosiTs, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BLACK
ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 17 (2000)
180. Id. at 5.
181. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010 (C2010BR-06) (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2OlO/briefs/c2OlObr-06.pdf
182. Local officials are defined as county officials and municipal officials - this includes
those serving on a county governing bodies or other county-wide boards, mayors
and members of municipal governing bodies and boards.
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The political success of African Americans - attributed to the Voting
Rights Act - raises an important question. With these successes, what is
the role of the Voting Rights Act today? There is no longer the type of
blatant, officially sanctioned race-based vote-denying policies that existed
in the 1960s. These obstacles were removed in the first decade of the Act,
in what has been described as the "Era of Participation."183 As the Voting
Rights Act was enforced, there was an influx of new voters into the sys-
tem. The political parties responded by staking out positions on issues of
civil rights to entice these new voters. As the positions crystallized, old
divisions and factions that held together the previously ideologically di-
verse parties began to break down.184 As the parties became ideologically
pure, they also became more polarized. If fact, one scholar argues that
the current level of hyper-partisanship was prompted by the passage of
the Voting Rights Act and the impact the influx of African American vot-
ers had on the system.18 5 The 1995 Republican revolution in Congress as
the point in time that began the era of extreme partisanship we see
today.186
In the current political and cultural context in which the original barri-
ers to voting have been removed and partisanship rules the day, the Vot-
ing Rights Act takes on a new dimension. It is now primarily utilized to
make claims of vote dilution - as opposed to intentional discrimination.187
This is a different type of concern. The point here is not to say that Voting
Rights Act has lost relevance, but to note that the Act has taken on new
role as societal and political attitudes shifted.
The combination of the change in the focus of the Voting Rights Act
from official discriminatory policies to discriminatory results, coupled
with the shift to a more polarized national political environment created
"enforcement space." The term "enforcement space" as used in the Vot-
ing Rights Act context is analogous to the way the United States Supreme
183. Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903,
904 (2008) ("[T]he hallmarks of the Era of Participation involved the creation, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of voting rights remedies that completely outlawed the
use of literacy tests. . ., that allowed federal officials to equitably apply registration
rules in places where local officials refused to do so, and that mandated the con-
ducting of elections in [languages other than English].").
184. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democ-
racy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 297 (2011) ("The political realignment launched
by the VRA [Voting Rights Act] was thirty to forty years in the making. It has
helped produce a world of political parties internally more coherent and unified




187. Jason Rathod, A Post-Racial Voting Rights Act, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL'Y
139, 187 (2011) ("Following litigation in the wake of the 1982 amendment, majority-
minority districts became the surest way for states to comply with Sections 2 and
5."); Benjamin E. Griffith & David D. O'Donnell, Sections Two and Five as Amended by
The Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, in AMERICA VOTES!
A GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 148 (Benjamin E. Griffin
ed., 2008)("Over the course of time these barriers [poll tax, literacy tests, white can-
didate slating] were eliminated from the electoral landscape and the courts began to
turn their attention to claims of 'minority vote dilution,' .... ").
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Court chooses which cases to put on its docket. It has been noted that as
societal concerns evolve, space on the Supreme Court's docket opens up
to consider the new issues.SS For example, issues related to civil liberties
moved onto the Supreme Court's agenda as the Court resolved the eco-
nomic issues that had dominated the Court's agenda prior to the 1940s.189
The same idea of space applies to the Voting Rights Act. After the
voting obstacles that existed in 1965 were eliminated, space opened on
the Justice Department's agenda to determine what type of actions were
sufficiently serious to justify intervention. 190 When the presence of en-
forcement space with extreme partisanship are combined, and the oppor-
tunity arises for the Voting Rights Act to be utilized as a tool for partisan
gains. Each new administration is able to determine the type of voting
rights violation will take priority.91 In this environment it is not surpris-
ing that claims of partisan enforcement of the Voting Rights Act were
made against the George W. Bush administration, and have continued
against the Obama administration.92
188. RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA:
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 181-90 (1991).
189. Id.
190. The use of the word "space" in this context is important. There are certain types of
obligations - such as preclearance under Section 5 of the Act - that exists outside
this discretionary space. This is not to say that these non-discretionary actions are
immune to claims of partisanship, but this article is particularly concerned with
discretionary actions brought by the Justice Department under Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.
191. Adam B. Cox, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2008) (find-
ing empirical evidence that partisanship governs decision making of federal judges
in Voting Rights Litigation).
192. Patrik Jonsson, New Black Panther Party Voter Intimidation Case: "Bombshell" for
Obama? THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/ Politics /2010/ 0924/New-Black-Panther-Party-voter-intimidation-case-
Bombshell-for-Obama (discussing testimony of former head of Department of Jus-
tice Voting Right's Section "alleging that under President Obama, the dismissive
attitude... toward white claims of disenfranchisement at the hands of blacks has
essentially become Justice Department policy"); Editorial, Racialist Justice; Attorney
General Holder's Lawyers Won't Protect Whites, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (July 16,
2010), http: / /www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/15/racialist-justice/ (ar-
guing that the Justice Department "has adopted a policy of refusing to enforce civil
rights laws on behalf of whites victimized by minority perpetrators"); Bill Nichols,
Voting Rights Act Pointed in a New Direction, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2006), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-03-voting-lawsuit-x.htm?csp =34
(stating that the first suit against an African American for violating voting rights of
whites "marks a striking change of focus by the Bush administration on voting
rights cases"); MARK A. POSNER, THE POLITICIZATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DECI-
SIONMAKING UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: Is IT A PROBLEM AND
WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS Do? AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POL-
ICY 1 (January 2006) available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Section%205%20
decisionmaking%201-30-06.pdf) (explaining that an issue raised in considering re-
newal of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act "is the degree to which Justice Depart-
ment enforcement of Section 5 has been corrupted by decisionmaking based not on
a good faith application of law to the facts of individual preclearance requests, but
instead on partisan political interests."). Posner concluded that there was a "real
and significant, but at the same time, limited concern" about use of Section 5 for
partisan purposes in the past and in the future. Id. at 2.
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Ellen Katz, an election law scholar,193 argues that partisan use of the
Voting Rights Act - even if the idea may seem unsavory - can operate in
practice to assert valid claims of voting discrimination.194 Professor Katz
may be correct that partisan enforcement of the Voting Rights Act will
often involve valid claims of discrimination even if pursued for partisan
purposes. However, there is also a partisan use of the Voting Rights Act
that has the potential of having a disproportionate and inappropriate im-
pact on African Americans.
To understand this potential, it is important to understand how dis-
criminatory intent can be established. Often the official policy or action
that is at issue is racially neutral on its face. To prove that these types of
laws were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent, evidence of past
discriminatory conduct could be used to frame the current facially-neu-
tral policy.
The case often cited to demonstrate how this past-conduct-indicating-
present-intent approach operates is Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corporation.195 In that case the Supreme Court
addressed a situation in which an organization (the Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corporation (MHDC)) sought to have a piece of prop-
erty rezoned to build low- and moderate-income housing.196 The Village
of Arlington denied the rezoning request and MHDC challenged the de-
nial arguing that it was done with racially discriminatory intent - because
the decision would have a disproportionate impact on minorities.197 The
Village argued that there was no discriminatory intent, but that the re-
quest was denied "to protect property values and the integrity of the Vil-
lage's zoning plan."198
The Court (which ultimately held there was not sufficient proof of dis-
criminatory intent), noted that "[d]etermining whether invidious discrim-
inatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."199
Then the Court notes, "[t]he historical background of the decision is one
evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes.... The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the deci-
sionmaker's purposes."200 In other words, prior statements and conduct
could be used as proof of discriminatory intent for actions subsequently
taken. In the appropriate context, this is a reasonable (and necessary) test
to determine discrimination.
193. Faculty Bio: Katz, Ellen D, UNIVERSrY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.
umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=ekatz (last visited May 28,
2013).
194. Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting Rights Act Might Not
Be So Bad After All 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 415, 418 (2012).
195. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also Texas v.
United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 152 (D.D.C. 2012).
196. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 254.
197. Id. at 257.
198. Id. at 259.
199. Id. at 266.
200. Id. at 267.
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So what is the problem with this method of proof? As discussed
above, many of the political accomplishments made by African Ameri-
cans regarding the right to vote were based on an appeal to collective
consciousness. This collective consciousness was often triggered through
an appeal to a common racial objective. Activists made racial appeals to
encourage African Americans to assert their rights. With enforcement
space opening up and partisan considerations coming to the forefront,
these prior statements could now be used as proof of discrimination
against these former activists who are now public officials.
It is impossible at this point to say how this concern will arise in cases
brought by the Justice Department in the future. The case of Ike Brown -
as the first case brought alleging voting discrimination against an African
American - provides an interesting case study. The case serves to
demonstrate the main points of this paper. First, it shows how space has
opened for the Voting Rights Act to become a partisan-based tool, where
cases are brought (or perceived to be brought) on the partisan preferences
of the administration in office.201 It also demonstrates how prior activism
by African American politicians could be used as evidence of a racial in-
tent when taking future action.
V. THE CASE OF IKE BROWN
Noxubee County is in eastern Mississippi - bordering on Pickens
County, Alabama. As of the 2010 census the county had a population of
approximately 11,545, ranking it 67th in population among Mississippi's
82 counties.202 The racial make-up of the county was 71.5% black and
27.4% white.203 With a median income of $21,798, 36.1% of the population
lives below the poverty line.204 It is ranked as the 55th poorest county in
the United States.205
The story of African Americans in Noxubee County is similar to that
in other localities around the south. Despite constituting a majority of the
population, there was no black member of the county board of supervi-
sors until 1971 (six years after passage of the Voting Rights Act).206 The
Mississippi legislature's "massive resistance" to African American voting
strength impacted Noxubee County as it did all Mississippi counties.
When the legislature passed a statute requiring at-large elections at the
201. The idea of perception and the Voting Rights Act's symbolism is important. The
Voting Rights Act has stood the test of time as a credible and objective enforcer of
voting rights. If this perception begins to shift, the Voting Rights Act itself runs the
risk losing legitimacy among voters.
202. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County Quick Facts: Noxubee County, Mississippi (2010),




205. Poverty Rate, DATAPLACE BETA, http://www.dataplace.org/rankings/?=&period=
+2000 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
206. United States v. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d 440, 449 (S.D. Miss. 2007) aff'd, 561 F.3d 420
(5th Circ. 2009) ("The year 1971 saw the county's first black candidates on the ballot,
and the first black elected official, Joseph Wayne, who won a seat on the Board of
Supervisors.").
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county level (as opposed to the prior ward-based elections), the state-
wide paper (the Clarion Ledger) reported that the state representative from
Noxubee County said that, without the change to county-wide elections,
"Noxubee County... might have trouble electing a white board because
three districts would vote white and two wouldn't."207 Things have dra-
matically changed since 1970. At the time that Ike Brown's case went to
trial,
Four of the five members of the Board of Supervisors are black;
five of five members of the Election Commission are black; five of
five members of the Board of Education are black; and with the
exception of the county prosecuting attorney, all countywide
elected officials are black, including the circuit clerk, chancery
clerk, sheriff, tax assessor, superintendent of education, coroner,
two justice court judges and two constables.208
Ike Brown came to Noxubee County in 1979, in the midst of the transi-
tion to African American political incorporation. He quickly developed
the reputation as a "political boss" in county politics,209 and assumed the
position as chair of the Democratic Executive Committee in 2000.210
Brown believed that his goal in politics was to get his candidates elected
and he selected and promoted candidates "focused above all else on rem-
edying persistent racial inequality."211 Over the years, Brown gained a
number of supporters and an equal number of enemies.
Brown's tactics as chair of the Democratic Executive Committee drew
the attention of the George W. Bush Justice Department. The Department
viewed Brown's actions as racially motivated to discriminate against
whites in the county. In a move that was "unprecedented"212; "extremely
remarkable"213; and a "dramatic symbol of the change of orientation
under the current [Bush] administration,"24 the Justice Department, for
the first time, charged Brown, an African American, with violating the
Voting Rights Act against white voters. The Justice Department brought
suit under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.215
As an "atypical Section 2 case" the court faced the threshold question
of whether the Act applied to Brown's conduct at all.216 In other words,
considering the history and context of adoption of the Voting Rights Act,
207. PARKER, supra note 5, at 54.
208. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 443. The court goes on to discuss African American success
not only in elected positions but also with regard to positions of power in the Dem-
ocratic party in the county, noting that the leading members of the party apparatus
are overwhelmingly African American. Id.
209. Jerry Seper, Lawsuit Accuses Black Officials of Violating Whites' Voting Rights, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2007/jan/31/20070131-121248-8802r/?page =all
210. Brown, 494 F.Supp. 2d. 440, 442.
211. COLIN CRAWFORD, UPROAR AT DANCING RABBIT CREEK: BATTLING OVER RACE, CLASS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT xiv (1996).
212. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 443.
213. Nichols, supra note 192(quoting Professor Steven Mulroy).
214. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 443.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 444.
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the court had to determine whether it applied to situations wherein white
voters asserted a claim of discrimination against African Americans. The
court first pointed out that the Voting Rights Act essentially restated the
Fifteenth Amendment, and therefore should be interpreted in the same
way as the Amendment.217 Relying on cases holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment applied regardless of race, the court held that Section 2 also
applied to the denial of voting rights regardless of the race of the
accused.218
The court then faced the issue of whether the Justice Department had
established its claim that Brown had discriminated.219 The government
claimed that Brown intentionally discriminated against white voters -
making the case unusual for that reason alone.220 In order for the court to
find a voting rights violation under Section 2 it must examine the "total-
ity of the circumstances" to determine if the challenged action results in
"members of the protected class having 'less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice."221 The "totality of the circum-
stances" is usually evaluated by utilizing the factors set out in the Senate
Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments. For direct discrimination
claims the factors provide evidence of discrimination: "direct or indirect
circumstantial evidence, including the normal inferences to be drawn
from the foreseeability of defendants' actions would be relevant evidence
of intent."222
Under Arlington Heights, intent to discriminate can be shown by prior
actions - which provides circumstantial evidence to color subsequent ac-
tion - even though the original actions would not constitute a violation
of the Voting Rights Act (because the original actions are private as op-
posed to state action).223 The court found such circumstantial evidence in
Brown. For example, in 1995, Ike Brown wrote an open letter "To the
Black Voters of Noxubee County" in which he exhorted African Ameri-
can voters:
Don't let them carry you back to the old days, when blacks were
found dead in the jail, you couldn't even go in the courthouse, you
weren't even respected, I help bring change to Noxubee County,
and I will be back soon. You must win this one yourself. I am
asking you to remember me by supporting these candidates who
have pledge to keep the dream alive .... Please support these
217. Id. at 444-46.
218. Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000) and United Jewish Org. of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. United
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carrey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
219. Id.
220. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d.at 446. ("Most Section 2 cases brought since the 1982 amend-
ment have been 'results' cases, rather than 'intent' cases, so there are few cases ad-
dressing the specific proof requirements in intent cases in the wake of the 1982
amendment.").
221. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 57 F.3d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir. 1995)).
222. Id. at 447 (quoting McMillan v. Escambia Cnty, 748 F.2d 1037, 1046-47 (5th Cir.
1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
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candidates. As Jessie Jackson said, 'Keep Hope Alive Vote Black
in '95.224
This letter was sent five years before Ike Brown became Chairman of
the Democratic Executive Committee in Noxubee County.225 As a private
citizen, Brown was free to promote a race-based agenda.226 However, be-
cause this prior action can provide proof of discriminatory intent, these
statements by Brown were regarded by the court as evidence that his sub-
sequent official actions were discriminatory:
Brown's comments and actions predating his tenure as NDEC
chairman present a clear picture of Brown's racial agenda and, to
the extent it might otherwise be unclear, give context and mean-
ing to his actions as NDEC chairman. This agenda did not change
when he assumed his duties as chairman of the NDEC in 2000
following his election to the position at the 1999 county
convention.227
For the court, without the prior racially-charged statements, it might
have been "unclear" whether Brown's official actions were the result of
partisanship or racial discrimination. By considering the official actions
in light of Brown's prior statements the court was able to determine
Brown's intent.
The question before the court was whether Brown's actions were
based on party concerns or racial concerns. Much of his conduct was
occurring during the era when a number of Mississippi Democrats were
shifting to the Republican party. The court found that, while Brown may
have partially been motivated by partisan concerns, he was at least par-
tially motivated by race - to discourage white voters from voting in the
Democratic primary.228
While this article focuses on the potentially dangerous precedent of
allowing prior statements from civil rights activists to be used as proof of
discriminatory intent under the Voting Rights Act, it is important to note
that in the case of Ike Brown, the government presented additional evi-
dence of Brown's racial intent. After Brown became chairman of the Nox-
ubee County Democratic Executive Committee, he attempted to recruit
black candidates who were not qualified to run for office with the pur-
pose of defeating a white candidate.229 When the candidate's qualifica-
tions were challenged, Brown obstructed the attempt to present the
challenge by holding a clandestine meeting on the petition without giving
224. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 450. Also in 1994, Brown entered a polling location and
announced to those in the room "You've got to put blacks in office, our candidates,
because we don't want white people over us anymore." Id.
225. See id. at 442.
226. Id. at 452 ("All of these remarks and incidents.. .occurred prior to Brown's ascent to
the chairmanship of the NDEC and have not been suggested by the Government to
have violated Section 2. Indeed, as an individual, Brown was free to promote his
racial views and agenda among the electorate with impunity.") (citing Welch v.
McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1985)).
227. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 452.
228. Id. at 476-77.
229. Id. at 452-54.
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sufficient notice.230 In addition, Brown published a letter in the local Nox-
ubee County newspaper appealing to African American voters to vote the
only white supervisor out of office - based. The letter read, in part, "[i]n
2003, 138 years after the end of slavery and 38 years after the passage of
the Voting Rights Act we still have the vestiges of discrimination and
slavery in Noxubee County. There is discrimination in the location of
paved roads and slavery to the Board of Supervisors in Noxubee
County."231
There was no evidence that these statements were actually true.
The government also presented evidence that Brown manipulated the
absentee ballot process. For example, while Brown was serving as Chair
of the Democratic Executive Committee, he hired notary publics to obtain
absentee ballots and paid the notaries based on the number of ballots ob-
tained (which is improper under Mississippi election law).232 In Missis-
sippi, in order to qualify for an absentee ballot, the voter must fit into a
particular category (such as being disabled or being out of the country).233
There was evidence that Brown's notaries would accept absentee ballots
from individuals who did not fit into one of the statutorily recognized
categories.234 Brown also interfered with the process of counting and
challenging absentee ballots.235 Brown would instruct poll managers to
count all the absentee ballots without giving poll watchers the opportu-
nity to challenge them.236 Finally, at Brown's direction, black poll workers
provided improper "assistance" to voters - by soliciting to provide as-
sistance without being asked - contrary to Mississippi law.237 In addi-
tion, poll workers would in some instances actually marking the ballot
without consulting the voter. 238
There was also evidence that Brown and his allies (which included the
sheriff's department) would treat white candidates and their supporters
differently at the polls than African American candidates. For example,
Brown demanded that a white candidate running for supervisor leave a
voting location and threatened to call the sheriff's office if he did not
leave.239 Under Mississippi law, the candidate had a right to be at the
location to cast his vote.240 The court also found that in 2003, Brown sent a
press release to the local newspaper listing 174 voters, and stating: "They
have either removed themselves from their precinct are in violation of
Section 23-15-575. That Code Section says voters who participate in pri-
mary elections must support the party nominees in the general elec-
230. Id.
231. Id. at 455.
232. Id. at 455-57.
233. United States v. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d 440, 449 (S.D. Miss. 2007) aff'd, 561 F.3d 420
(5th Cir. 2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-713 (West 2012)..
234. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 455-60.
235. Id. at 463-464.
236. Id. at 464-65.
237. Id. at 470-71; Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-549 (West 2012).
238. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 470-71; Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-549 (West 2012)
239. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 471-72.
240. Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-895 (West 2012).
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tion."241 The 174 listed voters were white.242 Brown could not show that
he had performed an investigation to determine how almost any of the
individuals listed had been disloyal to the Democratic Party.243 In addi-
tion, the court found it suspicious that almost all of the individuals listed
were in the district of the lone white supervisor.244
VI. EVALUATING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN TODAY'S PARTISAN
ENVIRONMENT
The case against Ike Brown, much like the man himself, is not simple.
On the one hand, as the evidence shows, the Brown case demonstrates
the continuing validity of the Voting Rights Act as written. Many of the
actions taken by Brown had explicit racial overtones - and were intended
to at least dilute whites' votes and at times even to prevent whites from
voting. Viewed through this lens, the case against Brown's behavior was
reminiscent of the type of conduct whites have utilized to prohibit Afri-
can Americans from voting and which prompted passage of the Voting
Rights Act. However, viewed another way, the case demonstrates the
unique problems that arise when using the Voting Rights Act is enforced
against African Americans.
When viewed in through this alternate lens, the Brown decision raises
concerns for the Voting Rights Act's future. This is a particular concern
for current African American political officials. At its most basic, the case
indicates that future administrations may feel political pressure to pursue
discrimination claims that historically would have been unprecedented.
To be even more specific, this partisan-based approach to the Voting
Rights Act should be particularly concerning in southern jurisdictions
with African American majorities. In these jurisdictions (such as Nox-
ubee County) there is the potential for a perfect storm of a partisan-based
discrimination claims. There is a history of discrimination in voting that
was not remedied until the Voting Rights Act (and which sometimes per-
sisted well afterward). There will often be political leaders in these juris-
dictions that were active during the Civil Rights Movement. These
political entrepreneurs likely made statements encouraging black solidar-
ity that involved racial appeals.245 Under Arlington Heights, these state-
241. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 474. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-575 (West 2012) ("No
person shall be eligible to participate in any primary election unless he intends to
support the nominations made in the primary in which he participates.").
242. Brown, 494 F.Supp.2d at 475.
243. Id. at 477.
244. Id.
245. Consider this statement from Brown's brief to the Fifth Circuit:
As the district court notes, when Brown first became involved in Noxubee
County politics in 1979, blacks were virtually shut out of political power, de-
spite outnumbering whites more than two to one. For over two decades, he
and others worked to help black candidates and voters navigate the barriers
that the white power structure in Noxubee had placed in their path. The work
of Brown and others eventually paid off, but it was not until thirty years after
passage of the Voting Rights Act that black candidates held even a bare major-
ity of elected offices in the county.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 9, United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2009).
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ments could be used to as proof that official actions taken today are done
with a discriminatory intent.
It is this aspect of the Brown case that is particularly disturbing.
Brown made this argument in his brief to the Fifth Circuit:
Brown's actions, prior to taking his position as Democratic Party
chair in 2000, evidenced a commitment to enfranchising the tradi-
tionally disenfranchised in a community still beset by racial divi-
sions - exactly the kind of citizen activism that, in the absence of
government enforcement of civil rights laws, was responsible for
seeing the guarantees of the Voting Rights Act brought to the
more remote corners of the Deep South.246
With regard to the letter in which Brown encouraged voters to "vote
black in 1995" Brown argued:
[T]he language in this letter is no more a "racial agenda" than the
pleas of hundreds of civil rights leaders over the years, who had
urged blacks to get out, vote and support candidates who were in
favor of civil rights... To infer a racial agenda from such activities
is to outlaw the very activities that the Voting Rights Act was de-
signed to protect.247
The use of this type of evidence to prove a present discriminatory in-
tent would be a perverse use of statements used to achieve civil rights
accomplishments - such as the Voting Rights Act.
To make it clear, the concern here is not for racial appeals made by
someone in an official position. For example, Ike Brown's statements and
actions while he was serving as Chair of the Democratic Executive Com-
mittee were legitimately constituted proof of a discriminatory present in-
tent. The concern regards the use of statements that were made to
encourage African American to take collective action as evidence that
subsequent official action was tainted by discriminatory intent.
How likely is it that this type of litigation will occur? It is impossible
to know. The Ike Brown case itself would have been unheard of ten years
ago. The point is that, with the creation of enforcement space, there is
uncertainty as to which way the partisan winds will blow. It might take
Congressional action to amend the Voting Rights Act to ensure that evi-
dence of statements made by an activist are excluded from consideration
of discriminatory intent if and when the activist becomes a public official.
Perhaps courts will adopt rules to exclude this type of evidence when
considering claims of discriminatory intent. It is crucial that these con-
cerns are considered moving forward. The Voting Rights Act -once de-
scribed as the "crown jewel"248 of the civil rights movement - runs the
risk of becoming just another tool used by political parties for partisan
gain without consideration of the purpose and the history of the Act.
246. Id.at 12.
247. Id.at 13-14.
248. Griffith & O'Donnell, supra note 187, at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION
In 1967, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered a speech entitled
"Where Do We Go From Here?"249 The speech addressed the ongoing
struggle for African American social and economic advancement. The
theme of that speech is equally relevant today in the context of the Voting
Rights Act. What should be the role of the Voting Rights Act in a rapidly
changing society in which race and partisanship intermingle in political
decisions? The case against Ike Brown demonstrates that the Department
of Justice has come to a point where it is politically acceptable to assert a
voting rights claim against an African American. It is an understatement
to say that the role of African Americans in political and social life has
changed dramatically since the adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
That change is a testament to both the collective will of those fighting for
civil rights and to the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. Once those
initial battles were won, however enforcement space opened up giving
discretion to those enforcing the Act to decide what type of conduct
should be pursued.
The Ike Brown case illustrates a contrast between the past and the pre-
sent - and provides an indication of what is to come with the Voting
Rights Act. A combination of the Voting Right Act's success and the ex-
treme polarization that exists today has resulted in a necessary reevalua-
tion of the purpose and scope of the Voting Rights Act. This shift will
raise unique issues and concerns that have not been faced before. One of
those issues is how to prove discriminatory intent when a Voting Rights
Act violation is brought against an African American.
249. Speech, Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here?, (Aug. 16, 1967),
available at http://mlk-kppOl.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/document-
sentry/where do-we-go-fromhere_delivered_at_the_l1th_annual_sclc_conven-
tion/.
